The War that Prevented Genocide: the Croatian Homeland War, 1991-1995:

Davor Domazet-Lošo: The war that prevented genocide: the Croatian Homeland War, 1991-1995: A Strategic ViewIn the southeast of Europe, the doctrine of a “surgical, clean war” such as the one in Iraq could not be implemented without it becoming a world war, but all of the conditions for implementing its supplementary doctrine, that of controller chaos, were favorable. To Anglo-Saxon strategists, a Yugoslavia that was caught up in a political upheaval and deliberately reawakened Serbian nationalism was a highly desirable test range for implementing that new doctrine. Tuđman’s reconciliation, as the strategic backbone of his politics, was based on the result of the tragic Croatian history in World War II, in which the Ustasha regime rightly lost their state, but the Croatian partisans unjustly did not get theirs. To cover-up of Serbian crimes, even the camps, and the postponement of the air strikes, and the toothless sanctions all had the goal of allowing Serbs to conquer as much of Bosnia and Herzegovina as possible, but also to cover up the acti of aggression, in order to buy time to prepare the preconditions for the “war of all against all”. It is no coincidence that the decision to establish the Hague Tribunal was made precisely on the 101st anniversary of the birth of Josip Broz Tito: that date is so dear to architects of the “new world order”. We can say that all of the sides in the Yugoslav managed crisis had some reason for Operation Storm to be executed. For Croatia, it was to finally liberate the occupied territories of Banovina, the Kordun, Lika and northern Dalmatia, and to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. For Greater Serbian politics, whether speaking of Plan A or Plan B, it was so that it could, in the long term, possibly be used to accuse every Croatian state of criminal intent towards the Serbs. In the case of United States of America, it suited them so that they could present themselves as the only superpower capable of solving an insoluble problem, as opposed to their European allies. For Greater Britain, it was desirable so that it could mark its pro-Serbian policies by equating the aggressor with the victim. The incorrigible Titoists needed it as “proof” that the period of fifty years ago was repeating itself in Yugoslavia. And finally, for the controllers of the managed crisis, it was the missing link for proving “the perilous nature of all nationalisms” which inevitably lead to criminality. Aware of “the state of the world”, Tuđman, as a historian, knew that only the total military defeat of the Serbs could suppress the Greater Serbian idea long-term, so that peace would finally prevail in the post-Yugoslav area. Stranica: 445Dimenzije: 16x21.5Jezik: ZagrebPismo: LatinicaStanje: Nova knjigaUvez: TvrdiGodina: 2019